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STATEMENT RELATED TO OTHER APPEALS

In re Discipline D. Bruce Oliver, case no. 20080087-SC
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
D. Bruce Oliver, Appellant appeals the final order and judgment of the Honorable
Anthony B. Quinn, of his 12/08/09 Minute Entry, certified as a final order on February 5,
2010. (R. 2328-2329 & 2356-2357) (See exhibit I & J). This Court has jurisdiction of
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(c) (discipline of lawyers). The
order entered by the trial court should have mirrored sanctions imposed by the other
jurisdiction. (See exhibit A) (e.g. R. 2274-2276)

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue One: When an attorney is publically disciplined in another jurisdiction

and the Utah State Bar by and through Office of Professional Conduct seeks to impose
reciprocal discipline through a District Court in Utah, based solely on the initial
discipline, is the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court in Utah limited to the
"equivalent' discipline as was imposed in the initiating tribunal? Yes.
Standard of Review: "[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment is based
on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against
whom it runs. See In re Marriage ofStroud, 631 P.2d 168, 170 n. 5 (Colo. 1981); 11 C
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973). Therefore, the

propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate,
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court. See Ron
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989);
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). (sic)" State, Dept. of Social
Services v. Vijil, 784 P. 2d 1130 (Utah 1989).

"Unlike matters within the general jurisdiction of the district courts, lawyer
discipline matters come to the district court as a partial delegation of our authority.
Under this court's constitutional mandate to govern "by rule" the practice of law, we
therefore review the district court's interpretation of the RLDD for correctness. In re
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, \ 12, 87 P.3d 712 (discussing article VIII, section 4 of the Utah
Constitution, which grants this court the power to regulate the practice of law)." In re
Discipline ofWelker, 100 P. 3d 1197 (Utah 2004).

Preservation of Issue: (R. 2262-2320)

2. Issue Two: In this case did the District Court exceed its subject matter jurisdiction
in the order dated January 9th, 2007? Yes.

Standard of Review: "[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment is based
on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against
whom it runs. See In re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168, 170 n. 5 (Colo. 1981); 11 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973). Therefore, the
propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate,
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becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court. See Ron
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989);
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). (sic)" State, Dept. of Social
Services v. Vijil, 784 P. 2d 1130 (Utah 1989).

"Unlike matters within the general jurisdiction of the district courts, lawyer
discipline matters come to the district court as a partial delegation of our authority.
Under this court's constitutional mandate to govern "by rule" the practice of law, we
therefore review the district court's interpretation of the RLDD for correctness. In re
Sonnenreich 2004 UT 3, f 12, 87 P.3d 712 (discussing article VIII, section 4 of the Utah
Constitution, which grants this court the power to regulate the practice of law)." In re
Discipline ofWelker, 100 P. 3d 1197 (Utah 2004).

Preservation of Issue: (R. 2262-2320)

3. Issue Three: May challenges to subject matter jurisdiction be raised at any time,
even for the first time on appeal? Yes.

Standard of Review: "[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a
claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking,
the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs.
See In re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168,170 n. 5 (Colo. 1981); 11 C Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973). Therefore, the propriety of the
jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question of
law upon which we do not defer to the district court. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt
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Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769
P.2d 245,247 (Utah 1988). (sic)" State, Dept. of Social Services v. Vijil, 784 P. 2d 1130
(Utah 1989).
"Unlike matters within the general jurisdiction of the district courts, lawyer
discipline matters come to the district court as a partial delegation of our authority.
Under this court's constitutional mandate to govern "by rule" the practice of law, we
therefore review the district court's interpretation of the RLDD for correctness. In re
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, \\2, 87 P.3d 712 (discussing article VIII, section 4 of the Utah
Constitution, which grants this court the power to regulate the practice of law)." In re
Discipline ofWelker, 100 P. 3d 1197 (Utah 2004).

Preservation of Issue: (R. 2262-2320)

STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 14-509, Utah Supreme Court Rules (exhibit D)
Rule 14-522, Utah Supreme Court Rules (exhibit E)
Due Process Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const, (exhibit F)
Article VIII, Section 4, Utah Const, (exhibit G)
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (exhibit H)
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STATEMENTS OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
The appeal is concerning the discipline of a lawyer, D. Bruce Oliver. On
November 5, 2009, Mr. Oliver filed a Motion to Correct Order for Lack of Jurisdiction.
The trial court judge, Anthony B. Quinn, denied the motion. (R. 2262-2320; 23282329; 2356-2357)
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On January 9, 2008, the trial court entered an order of discipline against D. Bruce
Oliver. That Order intended to be an Order of Reciprocal Discipline, bearing the name as
such. That Order of Reciprocal Discipline purported to follow the discipline of another
jurisdiction, the United States District Court, for the District of Utah. (R. 2209-2227)
The order was supposed to carry only a one-year suspension period. (R. 2224-2225)
On November 5, 2009, Mr. Oliver filed a motion to correct the order, because the
order entered contained additional sanctions not imposed by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Utah. (R. 2262-2320). After the issue was fully briefed, the trial court
denied the motion. (R. 2328-2329; 2356-2357)
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The trial court entered the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,

and Order of Reciprocal Discipline: Reprimand and Suspension on January 9, 2008. (R.
2209-2227)

2.

The effective date of the order was February 8, 2008 and Mr. Oliver was

suspended for one year beginning on February 8, 2008. (R. 2226)

3.

Mr. Oliver filed his Notice of Appeal on January 18, 2008. (R. 2251)

4.

The Utah Supreme Court entered default dismissal on April 22, 2008. (See

prior appeal, case #20080087-SC). (R. 2258-2261)

5.

On November 5, 2009, Mr. Oliver moved for the correction of the trial

court's order raising jurisdictional grounds for correction. (R. 2262-2263)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules 14-509 and 14-522, the trial court exceeded
his jurisdiction. The Order of Reciprocal Discipline contained additional sanctions that it
was not authorized to additionally impose in the course of disciplining a lawyer upon
reciprocal grounds. (R. 2262-2320)
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ARGUMENTS

POINT ONE.
WHEN AN ATTORNEY IS PUBLIC ALLY DISCIPLINED IN ANOTHER
JURISDICTION AND THE UTAH STATE BAR BY AND THROUGH OFFICE
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT SEEKS TO IMPOSE RECIPROCAL
DISCIPLINE THROUGH A DISTRICT COURT IN UTAH, BASED SOLELY ON
THE INITIAL DISCIPLINE, IS THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF
THE DISCTRICT COURT IN UTAH LIMITED TO THE "EQUIVALENT"
DISCIPLINE AS WAS IMPOSED IN THE INITIATING TRIBUNAL?
Supreme Court Rule 14-509 of the Rule for Lawyer Discipline and Disability (herein
after 14-509 RLD 1)) provides that there are 5 grounds to discipline an attorney. It provides that
there are 5 grounds to discipline an attorney. It provides:

Rule 14-509. Grounds for discipline.
It shall be a groundfor discipline for a lawyer to:
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct;
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening
panel imposing discipline;
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction;
(d) fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 14-526(e);
or
(e) fail to notify the OPC of public discipline in another
jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 14-522(a).
Paragraph (c) provides the basis for discipline against appellant in this matter. The
allegation that appellant was disciplined by the Federal Court, is undisputed, (see Exhibit A) It is
also undisputed that the discipline in the Federal Court was the sole basis for the discipline of
appellant by the Office of Professional Conduct (OPC). On June 5th, 2007 OPC corresponded
with Chief Justice Christine M. Durham requesting that she designate the appropriate forum
wherein the action should be filed, (see exhibit B). In pertinent part the letter states "(OPC)
7

intends to seek reciprocal discipline against D. Bruce Oliver based upon action taken by the
United States District Court of the District of Utah."

The very title of the order prepared by OPC and submitted to Judge Quinn and signed by
him is "ORDER OF RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE" (see exhibit C). When an attorney is subject
to "Reciprocal Discipline" in Utah, OPC is governed by different rules than attorneys who are
disciplined in Utah with the complaint originating through OPC. Reciprocal discipline is
governed by RLDD Rule 14-522. RLDD Rule 14-522 provides specifically that after
adjudication in the originating tribunal that a respondent has been adjudicated guilty of
misconduct "shall establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of disciplinary proceedings
in Utah." (RLDD Rule 14-522(e)). The merits of the case in the originating tribunal are
conclusive and not subject to further litigation in Utah. A respondent can only challenge 1)
deprivation of due process 2) equivalent discipline would result in grave injustice or (3) that the
conduct would warrant a different outcome in Utah or that the conduct would not be misconduct
in Utah, (see RLDD 14-522 (d)(l-3)) When this Court promulgated RLDD 14-522 it determined
that a hearing in the originating tribunal was all that was needed in Utah to impose Reciprocal
Discipline. In Utah a Respondent to Reciprocal Discipline is not entitled to go through the
standard channels of imposing discipline on an attorney in Utah. The respondent is deprived of a
screening panel and the opportunity to be heard by his peers before the Utah State Bar. There is
not just a presumption of correctness (which could be rebutted) but rather a finding of
conclusiveness (which is not rebuttable) under the provisions of RLDD 14-522 (e).

It appears as if this depravation of a respondent's due process in Utah was offset by this
Court in RLDD 14-522 where in this Court mandated that any discipline which was imposed as
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Reciprocal Discipline be the "equivalent" of the discipline imposed in the originating tribunal
(see RLDD 14-522). In three sub-sections of RLDD 14-522 the rule provides for "equivalent'
discipline. This then establishes the jurisdictional limits of Utah Courts as it pertains to
reciprocal discipline (This is not applicable to discipline originating from the Utah State Bar or
OPC). When OPC chooses to use Reciprocal Discipline to "establish conclusively the
misconduct for purposes of disciplinary proceeding in Utah" then OPC and the Court are limited
to imposing "equivalent" discipline upon the respondent. If OPC chooses to deviate from the
originating tribunal, the respondent should be afforded due process which would include, at a
minimum, notice and a hearing.

"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972).
Therefore, when an attorney is subjected to reciprocal discipline under RLDD 14-522 the
discipline is indeed reciprocal and equivalent to the discipline imposed by the originating
tribunal. It is then the order in the originating tribunal which limits the jurisdiction of the State
Court. In reciprocal discipline cases the jurisdiction of the Utah Court is the "equivalent" as
established by the originating tribunal, to exceed the "equivalent" discipline would deprive
respondent of his constitutionally provided and protected due process. The United States
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) stated:

The "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve
the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a
principle basic to our society." Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The fundamental requirement of due process is
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the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965); see Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394
(1914).

When an attorney is publically disciplined in another jurisdiction and the Utah State Bar
by and through Office of Professional Conduct seeks to impose reciprocal discipline through a
District Court in Utah, based solely on the initial discipline, is the subject matter jurisdiction of
the District Court in Utah limited to the "equivalent' discipline as was imposed in the initiating
tribunal? The answer in this situation is "Yes."

POINT TWO,
IN THIS CASE DID THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEED ITS SUBJECT
MATTER JURISTICTION IN THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 9 T H , 2007?

The order signed by the Court on January 9th, 2007 exceeded the jurisdiction of the Court
as established in RLDD 14-522 when it imposed sanctions in excess of the sanctions imposed in
the Federal Order of Discipline by adding extraneous provisions. When the Utah Court added
provisions not included in the Federal order it exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Court has indicated that when interpreting statutes it will rely on the clear meaning
of words which were used advisedly by the legislature.

In State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 40 (Utah 2002) this court
explained the method of interpreting statute (or rules) using the plain meang method:
10

In interpreting statute, our paramount concern is to give
effect to the legislative intent, manifest by the plain
language of the statute. State v. Lusk 2001 UT102, \19; 37
P3d 1103; Rezallns. Co. v. BotU 2001 UT 71, \W; 31 P3d
524; City of Hillsdale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, \36; 28 P3d
697. Unless a statute is ambiguous, we will not look beyond
the plain language of the statute. Lusk 2001 UT 102, ^19.
In doing so we "presume that the legislature used each
word advisedly and [we] give effect to the term according
to its ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. v Johnson,
1999 UT 35; 977 P.d 479, %9; 977 P.2d 479 (quoting
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah
1995)), and "we seek to render all parts [of the statutes]
revelant and meaningful."
Hall v. State Department ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, T[15; 24 P.3d 958 (quoting, Millet v. Clark Clinic
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)).

While this is specifically referencing statutes it is just as applicable to rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional authority (see Art. VIII, Section 4, Utah State
Constitution). Assuming that the Court chose its words advisedly and that we may rely on the
plain meaning of those words, the use of the word "equivalent" limits the jurisdiction of the trial
court. By adding additional procedures for reinstatement over and above those required by the
Federal Court, the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction. A quick perusal of the two orders
clarifies any issues or doubts (see exhibit A and C). The offending provisions in the Utah order
are those which state "It is FURTHER ORDERED..." On its face these provisions are additional
requirements over and above the federal order of discipline. The contents of the Federal order are
stated prior to these 3 additional paragraphs and requirements. When the jurisdiction of the Court
is clearly set out, any time the Court ventures outside the parameters of this clearly delineated
jurisdiction its actions are void. In State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995) the Court indicates
that jurisdiction should be raiseable at this time.
11

When a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate court can
vacate the illegal sentence without first remanding the case
to the trial court, even if the matter was never raised
before. This makes theoretical sense because an illegal
sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, should be
raisable at any time, (emphasis added)
Here in a criminal case the Court compares an illegal sentence to (subject matter)
jurisdiction which is raiseable at any time.

An equivalent comparison as to what the Court can and cannot do in a circumstance such
as this is, by comparison, in a criminal case sentencing. If the law provides that the maximum
fine to be imposed is $ 1000.00 the court cannot impose a fine of $ 1,000.01. The court lacks
jurisdiction to increase the fine. If the law provides that the maximum period of time for
imprisonment is 6 months in jail the court cannot impose a jail sentence of 6 months and 1
minute. The court lacks jurisdiction to increase the jail sentence. The equivalent principle applies
to this case. When the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court of Utah states that reciprocal
sanction shall be "equivalent" to those sanctions imposed by the originating tribunal, that's what
the jurisdiction of this court is.

In this case when the order of the Court dated January 9 , 2007 exceeded the
"equivalent" of the Federal order, the Utah Court exceeded its jurisdiction as set out by the
Supreme Court. In Kawamoto v. Fratto, 994 P. 2d 187 (Utah 2000), this Court while
acknowledging the legitimacy of the concerns of a party to a small claims action recognized that
the courts are bound by the language of the statute. In footnote number 5 the Court makes a clean
and unrefutable statement of the dilemma faced by the Court between practicality and the
statutory language when it states:
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The dissenting opinion cogently summarizes the policy
reasons for changing the statute to take those types of cases
out of small claims court. This court cannot rewrite the
statute, but we agree with the dissent that it needs review,
and hope that the legislature will undertake consideration
of the problems identified by this case and by the dissent.
Following the clear and unambiguous words of the rule are preferable to blazing new
trails without jurisdiction.

In 2004, this Court ruled that the reference to "equivalent" in RLDD 14-522 means
equal or lesser not more. In the case of In the Matter of the Discipline ofK Delbert Welker
#3118, 100 P. 3d 1197 (Utah 2004) this Court made a clear and unequivocal statement that:

[A]s the District Court noted, it is clear from the language in subsection (d) of Rule 22,
which allows the respondent attorney to contest equivalent discipline, that the
possibility of only an equivalent or less sever sanction was contemplated by the drafter
of the rule.
Thus it is clear that this Court has previously concluded that the word equivalent is a
phrase or word establishing the jurisdiction of the Utah Court as it relates to reciprocal discipline
of attorneys in Utah.

In this case did the District Court exceed its subject matter jurisdiction in the order dated
January 9th, 2007? The answer is "Yes."

13

POINT THREE.
MAY CHALLENGES TO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BE RAISED AT
ANY TIME, EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL?
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (4) allows the Court to review a void order. By the
nature of the fact that a void order is "void" there is no time limit to review and correct such an
order. In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P 2d 288 (Utah 1986) this Court stated:

This is consistent with holdings under the Federal Rules,
after which our Rules were patterned. As noted in Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862:
Rule 60(b)(4) [the equivalent to Utah Rule 60(b)(5)]
authorizes relief from voidjudgments. Necessarily a motion
under this part of the rule differs markedly from motions
under the other clauses of Rule 60(b). There is no question
of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is
under Rule 60(b)(4). Nor is there any requirement, as there
usually is when default judgments are attacked under Rule
60(b), that the moving party show that he has a meritorious
defense. 291 *291 Either a judgment is void or it is valid.
Determining which it is may well present a difficult
question, but when that question is resolved, the court must
act accordingly.
By the same token, there is no time limit on an attack on a
judgment as void. The one-year [three-month, in Utah]
limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is expressly
inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be
made within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to
apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4), cannot be enforced
with regard to this class of motion. A void judgment cannot
acquire validity because of laches on the part of the
judgment debtor.
Id. (footnote omitted).
In the case of Bernard v. Wasserman, 855 P. 2d 243 (Utah 1993) the Court stated:
This court has made it clear that challenges to subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any tme and cannot be
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waived by the parties. Olson, 724 P.2d at 964; Utah Dep 't
of Bus. Reg., 602P.2dat699; UtahR.Civ.P. 12(h)
Id.

The Court further emphasized that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the

parties.

An appeal is not a prerequisite to raising an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See State
v. Babbeli 813 P.2d 86. Just as noted in Brooks where the court compares an illegal sentence to
subject matter jurisdiction it is clear that either may be raised at any time.

"
an illegal sentence is void, a trial court may corrrect
an illegal sentence at any time. This Court has previoulsy
recognized the continuing jurisdiction of a trial court to
correct an illegal sentence. "
u

The trial court has this power at any time, whether before
or after an appeal, and even if there is no appeal. "
Id. (emphasis added)
There is no authority which suggests that subject matter jurisdiction has a time limit or
procedure to follow when challenging it. If the Court is absent subject matter jurisdiction the
judgment is void and can be challenged or raised at any time even without an appeal. Appellant's
motion was timely. Appellant's motion was supported by the law. Appellant's motion should
have been granted. Like a sentence in a criminal case which exceeds its statutory maximum so
the order in this case which exceeded its rule maximum the equivalent discipline, is void.

May challenges to subject matter jurisdiction be raised at any time, even for the first time
on appeal? The answer is "Yes."

15

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the District Court in Utah by rule must be limited to being equivalent to
the order of the United States District Court. When the District Court in Utah exceeds the
disciplinary sanctions as imposed by the United States District Court, it does so in excess of its
jurisdiction and the judgment is void. Void judgments may be challenged at any time. Therefore,
appellant requests that this Court reverse the judgment and order signed by Judge Quinn on
February 5th, 2010, as it pertained to his order of December 8th, 2009, as well order that the relief
sought in appellant's motion to correct judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21 st day of June, 2010.

*g
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Appellant Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 21st day of June, 2010,1 served
two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Adam C. Bevis #9889
Billy L. Walker #3358
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Dated this 21st day of June, 2010.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
.

—

N^flrMy

IN RE:
D. BRUCE OLIVER

COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF
ATTORNEY,

:

PUBLIC REPRIMAND AND
DISCIPLINARY ORDER

:

2:05 AD 4

:
:
2:06 MC 9H

v.
D. BRUCE OLIVER

:

The Disciplinary Pane! of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, having
reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Report and Recommendations of
Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner, the objections filed by D. Bruce Oliver (Mr. Oliver), and the
response of the Committee on the Conduct of Attorneys,findsthat the report and
recommendations are well supported by the record in tliis case and that the magistrate judge was
thorough and fair.
Mr. Oliver has also filed a motion to declare DUCivR 83-1.5 unconstitutional. The Panel
notes that this disciplinary proceeding is not the proper forum to make such a determination nor
can the Panel grant the relief sought.
The Panel finds that Mr. Oliver has violated rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 8.4(a) of the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct by filing fiivolous complaints, claims and/or contentions and by
failing to respond to orders to show cause, failing to respond to proper discovery requests and
failing to withdraw fiivolous claims when requested by opposing counsel or when dispositive
motions were filed.
The Panel emphasizes that the record abundantly demonstrates Mr. Oliver's fundamental
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lack of understanding of the proper relationship of counsel to clients, to the court, and to other
litigants and counsel. Qualified counsel honestly analyze facts presented by a client; forthrightly
communicate the weaknesses of a case to the client; carefully evaluate the viability of claims
before filing; communicate clearly and timely with the court and others in the litigation process;
and timely respond to requests and motions (rather than letting a default serve as a respotise).
Mr. Oliver's conduct does not meet these standards. While this record does not include (direct
factual information from the many clients who have been involved in these numerous cases, the
Panel is very troubled by the implications of this record for those individuals whose cases have
been dismissed or impaired. In addition, opposing parties and counsel have been directly
affected by Mr. Oliver's inability to exercise the fundamental skills of honest and timely analysis
and communication.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1)

D. BRUCE OLIVER shall be publically reprimanded and suspended from the
practice of law before the United States District Court for the District of Utah, and
precluded from appearing before any United States District Judge, United States
Magistrate Judge or United States Bankruptcy Judge for not less than one year,

(2)

Mr. Oliver shall have a period of thirty days from the date of this order to wind up
current legal affairs for matters pending before the United States District Court for
the District of Utah. Mr. Oliver is to give notice to all clients and opposing
counsel of his suspension and disqualification from the practice of law before this
court. Each client is to be notified of the importance of obtaining new counsel,
and Mr. Oliver shall follow the requirements of Rule 14-526 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct in winding down his matters before this court,

(3)

The Clerk of Court will unseal the Report and Recommendation in this case and
all subsequent papers. This Order shall be sent to the Office of Professional
Responsibility of the Utah State Bar, to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and to
the American Bar Association's National Discipline Data Bank, and to all judges
of the district and bankruptcy court, together with a copy of the Report and
Recommendation,

(4)

Mr. Oliver shall meet the following conditions in order to be reinstated: he shall
attend a class in professional responsibility sponsored by the Utah State Bar;
demonstrate by affidavit that he has substantially reorganized his law practice so
as to eliminate future misconduct mid acknowledge that he has violated the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct, and

(5)

If reinstated, Mr. Oliver shall be placed on a three-year period of probation. If a
formal disciplinary complaint is filed to which Mr. Oliver has been given the
opportunity to respond and the complaint is referred to the Committee for
investigation during that probationary period, Mr. Oliver may be immediately
suspended for six months, if the investigator finds that Mr. Oliver has again
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violated rule 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 or 8.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Dated this 4K_ day of April, 2007

id Stewapr, District Judge
lij^afme Disciplinary Panel

David Nuffer, Magistrate Judge

ufdithfeoulden,Bantoiptcy Judge
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Chief Justice Christine M. Durham
Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:
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OPC Reciprocal Discipline Matter 07-0247 against D. Bruce Oliver

Dear Chief Justice Durham:
Pursuant to Rule 14-522(d) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability, the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC")
intends to seek reciprocal discipline against D. Bruce Oliver based upon
action taken by the United States District Court for the District of Utah. In
order to do so, the OPC must file a formal complaint against Mr. Oliver in
the District Court.
As background, Mr. Oliver has been disciplined for violating Rules
3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 8.4(a), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Mr. Oliver
practices in Salt Lake County, and the offenses were committed in Utah.
Pursuant to the requirement of Rule 14-511(b) of the Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability, which states that the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court designates the county where the case will be tried, the
OPC respectfully requests that the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake
County be the designated court. The OPC anticipates that this would be
convenient to OPC counsel and would not unduly inconvenience Mr.
Oliver.
Thank you for your attention in this matter
Sinoferejy,

Jarbara L. Townsend
"Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
BLT/ad
cc: D. Bruce Oliver
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FILED DISTRICT COURT

Third Judicial District
JAN - 9 2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

Jtil

Deputy Clerk

Barbara L Townsend, #5568
Assistant Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-9110

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

I
)
)
)
I

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

D. Bruce Oliver, #05120
Respondent.

']

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER OF RECIPROCAL
DISCIPLINE: REPRIMAND AND
SUSPENSION
Civil No. 070909858
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

]

This matter carne before the Court based on a Petition for Reciprocal Discipline
filed by the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"). Respondent, D.
Bruce Oliver, represents himself. Barbara L. Townsend, Assistant Counsel, represents
the OPC.
The Court, having reviewed and considered the Petition for Reciprocal Discipline
and having read all pleadings submitted by the Parties, having heard oral argument and
taken the previously filed matters, the Court now enters it Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. Oliver is an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah.

2.

Mr. Oliver has been practicing law for over 16 years.

3.

During his 16 years of practice, Mr. Oliver has handled numerous cases

before the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division ("District
Court").
4.

On April 4, 2007, the District Court entered a Public Reprimand and

Disciplinary Order publicly reprimanding Mr. Oliver and suspending Mr. Oliver from
practicing before that court for a period of not less than one year based on his conduct
in numerous cases before the District Court in violation of Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and
8.4(a).
5.

The facts and procedures of the District Court are as follows:
a. Judge Paul G. Cassell filed an Attorney Misconduct Complaint against
Mr. Oliver on August 23, 2005 based upon his review of 28 cases.
Judge Cassell referred the matter to both the OPC and to the District of
Utah's Disciplinary Panel ("the Paner).
b. Judge David K. Winder, Chair of the Panel, referred the matter to the
Committee on Conduct of Attorneys ("the Committee").
c. The Committee then designated one of its members, Peggy Tomsic, to
investigate and review the materials submitted and to prepare a report
and recommendation to the Panel as to what form of discipline, if any,
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to impose on Mr. Oliver pursuant to DUCivR 83-1.5.
d. Ms. Tomsic

prepared

a Report and

Recommendation

for

the

Committee based upon her investigation of the cases referred.
e. The Report stated that in at least 18 of the cases referred to it, Mr.
Oliver had "engaged in a disturbing practice of filing and prosecuting
frivolous claims, knowingly delaying discovery responses, and/or
knowingly failing to respond to orders to show cause."
f.

The Report also noted that Mr. Oliver engaged in further discovery
misconduct after being referred to the Panel.

g. The Committee adopted the Report and Recommendation

and

presented it to the Panel recommending to the Panel that Mr. Oliver be
publicly reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three months.
h. The Panel requested, pursuant to Rule 83-1.5(h)(3)(B), that the Chair
of the Committee designate a neutral hearing examiner to hear the
evidence against Mr. Oliver.
i.

Since no member of the Committee was able to serve as the neutral
hearing

examiner,

Chief

Judge

Dee

Benson

issued

an

order

designating Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner ("Hearing Examiner") as
the neutral hearing examiner.
.

The Hearing Examiner set an evidentiary hearing for December 13 and
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14, 2006 with a pretrial motion cut off date of December 1, 2006.
k. On December 6, 2006, the Hearing Examiner issued a Scheduling
Order stating that the hearing was to go forward as scheduled and that
a ruling on the motions would be included in the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation.
I.

The evidentiary Hearing was held on December 13 and 14 with the
Committee being represented by Ms. Tomsic and Mr. Oliver being
represented by Orson B. West,

m. On February 27, 2007, the Hearing Examiner issued his Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and also ruled on five motions that Mr.
Oliver had filed just before the motion cut-off date.
n. The findings of the Hearing Examiner are summarized as follows:
On December 1, 2006, prior to the evidentiary hearing, Mr.
Oliver filed five separate motions to dismiss the disciplinary
action in its entirety. The Hearing Examiner's rulings on the
motions were made part of his Findings. In his first motion to
dismiss, Mr. Oliver contended that he was denied due process
because he did not receive adequate notice of the charges
against him and was not afforded the opportunity to be heard.
The Hearing Examiner found that there was "no question that
Mr. Oliver received ample notice of the charges against him and
had a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against those
charges." The first motion to dismiss was therefore denied.
In his second motion to dismiss, Mr. Oliver contended that the
allegations against him were quasi-criminal in nature and
required a clear and convincing standard.
The Hearing
Examiner found that the appropriate standard was a
preponderance of the evidence and also found that, in this case
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it made no difference because "Mr. Oliver's violations of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct have been proved by clear
and convincing evidence." Mr. Oliver's second motion to dismiss
was therefore denied.
In his third motion to dismiss, Mr. Oliver argued that he had
already been sanctioned in some of the underlying matters and
that therefore, the doctrine of collateral estopple prohibited
further sanctions in those cases. The Hearing Examiner found
that Mr. Oliver "failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to a
collateral estopple defense." Therefore, Mr. Oliver's third
motion to dismiss was denied.
In his fourth motion to dismiss, Mr. Oliver contended that
because he had already been publicly reprimanded by an article
published in the Salt Lake Tribune, by the Tenth Circuit in a
published decision, and by Magistrate Judge Wells in her report
and recommendation to Judge Cassell any further sanction is
barred by collateral estopple. The Hearing Examiner found that,
even assuming that any of the other matters constituted a
"public reprimand," that did not prohibit further and/or greater
sanctions against Mr. Oliver for repeated violations of the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct. The Hearing Examiner, thus,
denied Mr. Oliver's fourth motion to dismiss.
In his fifth motion to dismiss, Mr. Oliver argued that he had been
deprived of due process because Mr. Roger Segal, acting Chair
of the Committee, allegedly had a personal vendetta against
him. According to the Hearing Examiner, "[o]ther than Mr.
Oliver's speculation . . . he has provided no factual basis for his
assertion." Therefore, the Hearing Examiner denied Mr. Oliver's
fifth motion to dismiss.

o. The Hearing

Examiner found that the following

specific

cases

illustrated Mr. Oliver's repeated violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct:
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In Cook v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2:05cv16 TS, the
Court dismissed the third cause of action based on Mr. Oliver's
failure to respond to a motion to dismiss. Mr. Oliver's defense
was that he did not need to respond because, in his opinion, the
motion had merit.
In Holmes v. Utah, 2:04cv940 PGC, Mr. Oliver filed a complaint
for an adverse employment action. The Court issued an order
to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure
to serve process within 120. days. Mr. Oliver, in response, failed
to appear stating that he and his client had voluntarily agreed
not to pursue the case.
In Drake v. Utah, 2:04cv689 DAK, the action was dismissed
after Mr. Oliver failed to respond to motion to dismiss. Mr.
Oliver's response to this allegation was that he did not respond
to the motion because it had merit.
In Bohn v. Jordan School District, 2:04cv531 RS, the court
issued an order to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for failure to serve process within 120 days. Although
the order to show cause specifically stated that the plaintiff was
directed to respond in writing, Mr. Oliver did not respond. His
defense to this allegation was that he believed that not
responding was an option given by the court.
In McGraw v. Salt Lake Community College, 2:03cv765 TS, Mr.
Oliver failed to respond to a motion to dismiss the RICO claims
he had filed. His defense to this allegation was that RICO
claims seem to be unwelcomed in Utah. Subsequently, the
court dismissed all the claims except a Title VII claim. The court
issued an order to show cause on the remaining claim because
of plaintiff's lengthy silence on that claim in the case. Mr. Oliver
stated that he allowed the dismissal of the remaining claim for
tactical reasons.
In Riveria v. Salt Lake Community College, 2:03cv764 DB,
opposing counsel filed three motions to compel after Mr. Oliver
had failed to provide discovery responses. After the third
motion to compel was filed, Mr. Oliver advised opposing counsel
that he would be withdrawing because of a conflict. Before he
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withdrew from the case he promised to provide the outstanding
discovery. Three months after notifying counsel of his conflict,
he filed a withdrawal notice and notice to stay the proceedings.
He failed to provide the discovery responses and failed to
respond to the motions to compel.
In Beene v. Utah, 2:02cv322 DAK, the court granted Rule 11
sanctions against Mr. Oliver for bringing non-meritorious
Eleventh Amendment claims against the Attorney General's
Office, after the court had already instructed him on at least
three other occasions that the Attorney General's Office was
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The court imposed a sanction in the amount of
$500.
In Salas v. Brems, 2:02cv273 TS, Mr. Oliver filed a complaint on
behalf a client. The court issued an order to show cause why
the matter should not be dismissed. Mr. Oliver failed to respond
and the matter was dismissed. Mr. Oliver's defense was that
the client had disappeared and the case was filed only to avoid
a malpractice action by the client.
In Martin v. Salt Lake Community College, 2:04cv141 DB, Mr.
Oliver filed a complaint alleging discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although, at the time he filed the
complaint, it was contrary to controlling case law. Mr. Oliver
requested leave to file an amended complaint, which the court
granted him 30 days to file. No amended complaint was filed
and the court dismissed the action.
In Trujillo v. Group 4 Falck, 2:02cv 162 TC, Mr. Oliver failed to
respond to a motion to dismiss and two of the three plaintiffs
were dismissed from the case. Mr. Oliver's defense was that
the motion had merit, and therefore, no response was
necessary.
In Spitler v. Ogden City Corp., 1:03cv 119 PGC, Mr. Oliver failed
to comply with discovery requests. Two motions to compel
were filed and one was granted. The court imposed sanctions
of $4800 against Mr. Oliver. The court later also granted
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summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the claims Mr.
Oliver asserted against the defendants.
In Jaramillo v. Price, 2:02cv619 DB, the court granted summary
judgment granted against Mr. Oliver's client and ordered Mr.
Oliver to pay attorney fees based on the insufficient basis upon
which the lawsuit was filed.
In Joseph v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2:00cv340 DAK, the court
granted Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Oliver for filing pleadings
with unsupported allegations of criminal and professional
misconduct against the opposing party and opposing counsel.
The court granted, in part, the Attorney General's motion to
dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.
The court admonished Mr. Oliver for bringing unmeritorious
claims and awarded attorney fees to the defendant in the
amount of $2340.
In O/seth v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2:00cv402 TC, The court
dismissed the complaint after Mr. Oliver failed to respond to an
order to show cause for failure to prosecute after nearly two
years of inactivity. Mr. Oliver stated that he did nol respond
because his client had disappeared.
In Johnson v. Salt Lake Community College, 2:03cv1050 PGC,
Mr. Oliver filed an opposition to a motion to dismiss over two
weeks late without explanation for the late filing. Later, Mr.
Oliver stated that it was not late because the motion had been
converted to a motion for summary judgment However, in his
late filing, he repeatedly referred to the motion as a motion to
dismiss.
In Lee v. Smith's Food and Drug, 2:03cv810 TC, the court
granted defendants' motion to compel after Oliver failed to
provide
initial
disclosures
and
discovery
responses.
Defendant's counsel repeatedly, by phone and letter, attempted
to obtain the responses from Mr. Oliver. Mr. Oliver repeatedly
promised responses but failed to produce them. Mr. Oliver also
failed to respond to the motion to compel. Mr. Oliver admits that
he did not provide the requested discovery responses in a
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timely way but stated that he streamlined his staff and office
procedures to rectify the problem.
In Fox v. Triton Investments, Inc., 2:02cv628 PGC, Mr. Oliver
promised to update the court as to the status of the case. The
court issued an order to show cause why the matter should not
be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mr. Oliver testified at the
evidentiary hearing that he could not move the case forward
because his client had been arrested on a federal charge and
no longer had contact with the client. Mr. Oliver failed to update
the court as he promised and failed to respond to the order to
show cause.
In Matthews v. South Ogden, 1:03cv117 PGC, Mr. Oliver
responded to an order to show cause that directed his client to
explain why he had not responded to a motion to compel. In his
response, Mr. Oliver conceded that he failed to respond
because the motion had been well founded; it was his fault, not
his clients; and that an award for attorney fees would be
appropriate in the case.
In Palmer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2:04cv956 DAK, Mr. Oliver
engaged in conduct that the Magistrate found to be sanctionable
and warranted a dismissal of the case. Opposing counsel
attempted to obtain discovery responses and set depositions.
After failing to do so, opposing counsel filed a motion to compel.
During the hearing concerning the motion to compel, the
Magistrate initially was going to recommend that the case be
dismissed based on Mr. Oliver's assertion that he could not
attend a deposition because of a scheduling conflict. Mr. Oliver
was sanctioned in the amount of $2688.26. The court warned
Mr. Oliver that if he further failed to cooperate with opposing
counsel and court orders, the action would be dismissed.
Thereafter, opposing counsel filed a second motion for
sanctions and motion to strike to which Mr. Oliver failed to reply.
The Magistrate recommended that the case be dismissed based
on Mr. Oliver's continued discovery abuses. The District Court
judge adopted the recommendation from the Magistrate and
dismissed the case.
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o. The Hearing Examiner wrote in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law that "Mr. Oliver's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was often
incredible and at times outrageous,
p. He was antagonistic, defensive, arrogant, and combative in his
testimony."
q. The Hearing Examiner gave numerous examples of the testimony that
he felt demonstrated a defiant attitude on the part of Mr. Oliver,
r. The Hearing Examiner concluded his remarks by stating that Mr.
Oliver's testimony "revealed that, at best, Mr. Oliver is completely
uninformed about his professional responsibilities, and at worst, he
was lying under oath."
s. The Hearing Examiner concluded that Mr. Oliver understood that his
practice before the United States District Court was governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Professional
Responsibility,
t.

Further, the Hearing Examiner noted that Mr. Oliver understood that
the District Court had the authority to sanction him for any violations of
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,

u. According to the Hearing Examiner, despite Mr. Oliver's professed
understanding of the rules, "he has knowingly engaged in a pattern of
not responding to legitimate discovery requests, orders to show cause,

and dispositive motions, and continued that pattern even after Judge
Cassell filed the Complaint in this matter."
v. Mr. Oliver was charged with violating rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 8.4(a) of
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
w. Based upon the specific cases, the report and recommendations of the
Committee and Mr. Oliver's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the
Hearing Examiner concluded that: (1) Mr. Oliver violated rules 3 1 and
8.4(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by filing frivolous
complaints, claims, and/or contentions; and (2) Mr. Oliver violated rules
3.2, 3.4, and 8.4(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by
failing to respond to orders to show cause, failing to respond to proper
discovery requests, and failing to withdraw frivolous claims either upon
request by opposing counsel or when dispositive motions were filed
relative to those claims.
x. The Hearing Examiner found the following aggravating circumstances
to have been proven not only by a preponderance of the evidence, but
by clear and convincing evidence: (1) Mr. Oliver was disciplined by the
District Court on at least'eight occasions for discovery violations, rule
11 violations, or filing baseless claims; (2) Mr. Oliver engaged in a
pattern of misconduct; (3) Mr. Oliver committed multiple offenses by
violating rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 8.4(a)
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Utah Rules of
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Professional Conduct; (4) Mr. Oliver refuses to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of his conduct; and (5) Mr. Oliver has substantial
experience in the practice of law.
y. As a mitigating circumstance, the Hearing Examiner found that there
was no evidence that Mr. Oliver's conduct was driven by a dishonest or
selfish motive,
z. In view of this, the Hearing Examiner found that "any mitigating
circumstances are substantially outweighed by the aggravating factors
based on the facts that (a) Mr. Oliver has been admonished and/or
sanctioned by the court to no avail in several of the underlying cases,
(b) he has continued his pattern of misconduct after the Complaint was
filed in this matter, and (c) he has continued to refuse to acknowledge
the wrongful nature of his misconduct."
aa.The Hearing Examiner concluded that the six-month suspension that
was recommended by the Committee was not sufficient.
bb.The Hearing Examiner recommended to the Panel that Mr. Oliver be
publicly reprimanded and suspended him from the practice of law
before the United States District Court for the District of Utah for a
period of at least one year.
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cc. The Hearing Examiner also recommended that, while suspended and
prior to reinstatement, Mr. Oliver is required to attend a class on
professional responsibility from the Utah State Bar.
dd.The Hearing Examiner further recommends that, as a condition of
reinstatement, Mr. Oliver file an affidavit required under DUCCivR 831.5(i) that he has reorganized his law practice and he acknowledges
his conduct violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
ee.The Hearing Examiner finally recommended that upon reinstatement,
Mr. Oliver be placed on three-year probation,
ff. If at any time Mr. Oliver again violates the above-mentioned Utah
Rules of Professional

Conduct

and after a formal

disciplinary

complaint, Mr. Oliver is to be immediately suspended for six months.
gg.The Disciplinary Panel reviewed the Hearing Examiner's Findings and
the objections filed by Mr. Oliver and found that the Findings were "well
supported by the record in this case and that the magistrate judge was
thorough and fair."
hh.The Panel adopted the Committee's finding that Mr. Oliver violated
Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 8.4(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct and adopted the discipline recommended by the Hearing
Examiner.
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ii. The Public Reprimand and Disciplinary Order of the Panel was entered
on April 4, 2007 and ordered Mr. Oliver to be suspended from the
practice of law in the District Court for one year.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
1.

The Court's review of the disciplinary process from the federal Court is

very limited.
2.

Roger Segal's presence on the Committee did not violate Mr. Oliver's due

process rights by depriving him of notice or an opportunity to be heard.
3.

Simply because a federal magistrate judge conducted the disciplinary

hearing in this case, does not mean that Mr. Oliver was deprived of a trial de novo
before the district Court judge.
4.

Since, in this case, the hearing officer's decision is referred to the

Committee and the Committee may either accept of reject or modify the report, Mr.
Oliver was not entitled to a de novo review before a district court judge.
5.

The Findings of Fact of Magistrate Warner are thorough, detailed and

reflect the full opportunity Mr. Oliver had to present and argue his case.
6.

Any technical defects do not rise to the level of denying Mr. Oliver an

opportunity to be heard.
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7.

That a different practice exists in state Court versus federal Court does not

justify Mr. Oliver's refusal to obey a Court's order when that order was sufficiently clear
to alert Mr. Oliver that something was required of him in federal Court.
8.

Since simply ignoring the order in federal Court was not appropriate, it

was hot grave injustice for Mr. Oliver to be disciplined for this conduct.
9.

Res Judicata does not apply to this case because the issues and rule

violations previously before the OPC were different than the issues and rule violations
before the federal Court for which Mr. Oliver was disciplined.
10.

Mr. Oliver's offenses are more than technical defects.

11.

Mr. Oliver's seven years of repeat violations of the Utah Rules of

Professional Conduct constitute far more than technical defects.
12.

Mr. Oliver is not being singled out for technical defects in his pleadings,

but for the fact of his unprofessional conduct.
13.

Because Mr. Oliver's conduct was found to be knowing and to have

caused potential harm to the justice system, the presumptive discipline is suspension.
14.

The mitigating evidence in Mr. Oliver's favor was not ignored, rather the

aggravating circumstances outweighed any such mitigating circumstances, so that any
deviation in discipline would tend towards increased discipline, not less.
15.

Client testimony is not required to sanction attorneys because attorney

conduct is governed by rules not by the opinions of or testimony or an attorney's client.
16.

Mr. Oliver's conduct was sanctionable under Utah law.

17.

The federal procedures against Mr, Oliver did not deprive him of his due

process rights.
18.

The imposition of equivalent discipline against Mr. Oliver in state Court

would not result in grave injustice.
19.

Mr. Oliver's misconduct does not warrant substantially different discipline

in this Court.
20.

Based on the foregoing, reciprocal discipline in the state Court of Utah is

appropriate.
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Mr. Oliver's
misconduct and violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT:
D. Bruce Oliver is hereby reprimanded and suspended for his conduct in the
United States District Court for Utah as follows:
1.

That Mr. Oliver is publicly reprimanded and suspended from the practice

of law in the State of Utah for a period of one year.
2.

That, while suspended and prior to reinstatement, Mr. Oliver is required to

attend a class on professional responsibility from the Utah State Bar.
3.

That, as a condition of reinstatement, Mr. Oliver file an affidavit required

by the United States District Court for Utah under DUCCivR 83-1.50) in this Court as

well as the District Court that he has reorganized his law practice and he acknowledges
his conduct violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
4.

That upon reinstatement, Mr. Oliver be placed on three-year probation. If

at any time Mr. Oliver again violates the above-mentioned Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct and after a formal disciplinary complaint, Mr. Oliver is to be immediately
suspended for six months.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that during the one year suspension, Mr. Oliver is
hereby enjoined and prohibited from practicing law in the State of Utah, holding himself
out as an attorney at law, performing any legal services for others, giving legal advice to
others, accepting any fee directly or indirectly for rendering legal services as an
attorney, appearing as counsel or in any representative capacity in any proceeding in
any Utah court or before any Utah administrative body as an attorney (whether state,
county, municipal, or other), or holding himself out to others or using her name in any
manner in conjunction with the words "Attorney at Law", "Counselor at Law", or
"Lawyer";
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Oliver shall comply with all parts of Rule 14525 of the RLDD concerning reinstatement to the practice of law in the State of Utah
one year from the effective date of this order; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Oliver shall comply with all parts of Rule 14526 of the RLDD and to begin the one year suspension on the effective date of this
order. Pursuant to Rule 14-526(a) of the RLDD Mr. Oliver shall have thirty (30) days

from the date of this order to wind down his practice, thus the effective date of this order
is thirty (30) days from the date of this order.

DATED this the

f

r/*

day of

fWh,

2007.

An

,
Third Judici
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^

day of "CWJu^M 2007, I mailed via United

States Mail, first class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF
RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE: REPRIMAND AND SUSPENSION to
D. Bruce Oliver
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1490
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Rule 14-509

Rule 14-509. Grounds for discipline.
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to:
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct;
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening panel imposing discipline;
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction;
(d) fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 14-526(e); or
(e) fail to notify the OPC of public discipline in another jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 14-522(a).
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Rule 14-522

Rule 14-522. Reciprocal discipline.
(a) Duty to notify OPC counsel of discipline. Upon being publicly disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, or
a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Utah shall within 30 days inform
the OPC of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court has been publicly disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary
jurisdiction, OPC counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order.
(b) Notice served upon lawyer. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to
practice in Utah has been publicly disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having
disciplinary jurisdiction, OPC counsel shall issue a notice directed to the lawyer containing:
(b)(1) a copy of the order from the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory body; and
(b)(2) a notice giving the lawyer the right to inform OPC counsel, within 30 days from service of the notice, of any
claim by the lawyer predicated upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (d), that the imposition of the equivalent
discipline in Utah would be unwarranted, and stating the reasons for that claim.
(c) Effect of stay of discipline in other jurisdiction. If the discipline imposed in the other court, jurisdiction or
regulatory body has been stayed, any reciprocal discipline imposed in Utah shall be deferred until the stay expires.
(d) Discipline to be imposed. Upon the expiration of 30 days from service of the notice pursuant to paragraph (b),
the district court shall take such action as may be appropriate to cause the equivalent discipline to be imposed in
this jurisdiction, unless it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated that:
(d)(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due
process;
(d)(2) the Imposition of equivalent discipline would result in grave injustice; or
(d)(3) the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in Utah or is not misconduct in this
jurisdiction.
If the district court determines that any of these elements exist, it shall enter such other order as it deems
appropriate. The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate that the imposition of equivalent discipline is not
appropriate.
(e) Conclusiveness of adjudication in other jurisdictions. Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) above, a final
adjudication of the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory body that a respondent has been guilty of misconduct shall
establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in Utah.
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United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the
United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by
a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or
any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.
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Utah Constitution / Code
Article VIII Judicial Department
Section Section 4 [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court — Judges pro tempore — Regulation of practice
of law.]
Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court — Judges pro tempore —
Regulation of practice of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore
shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme
Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law.
No History for Constitution
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 00I08_000400.ZIP 1,944 Bytes
«Previous Section (Article VIIL Section 3)

Next Section (Article VIIL Section 5 ) »
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Rule 60

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Advisory Committee Notes
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE
OF,
Petitioner,

MINUTE ENTRY

vs.
D BRUCE OLIVER,
Respondent.

Case No: 070909858
Judge: ANTHONY B QUINN
Date:
December 8, 2009

Respondent's Motion to Correct Order for Lack of Jurisdiction is
Denied.
The motion is untimely.
There is no matter raised in
the motion that implicates the jurisdiction of the Court.
The
motion simply seeks to correct what Respondent believes is a
legal error.
The time limits of Rule 59 apply to such a request.

Date:

\l\<b\0°\
By /
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE
OF,
Petitioner,

MINUTE ENTRY

vs.
D BRUCE OLIVER,
Respondent.

Case No: 070909858
Judge: ANTHONY B QUINN
Date:
February 5, 2010

The Court hereby adopts its Minute Entry of December 8, 2009 as an
order in this case.
No other order is necessary.

Date: 2[«?//6
PHONY
STAM
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